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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The global financial crisis that began in 2007 and 
deepened in 2008 exposed major weaknesses in financial 
and macroeconomic policy coordination, and profound 
flaws in financial risk management and regulation in a 
number of advanced countries. The severity of the crisis 
led global leaders to recognize that they must find a way 
to reform the global regulatory architecture to ensure that 
the financial system can absorb shocks while continuing to 
function efficiently.
In response to the crisis, the Group of Twenty (G20) met 
in November 2008, for the first time at the leaders level, 
to agree on a comprehensive strategy to restore trust in 
the financial system and to limit the fallout from the crisis 
on global output and employment. Currently, there is 
a complicated governance structure for the program to 
reform the global architecture of financial regulation that 
consists of three entities — one ad hoc and self-selected 
(G20), one treaty-based and systemic (International 
Monetary Fund [IMF]) and one a creation of the G20 
(Financial Stability Board [FSB]). This paper undertakes 
an analysis of how cooperation takes place among these 
actors to implement the fundamental reforms needed to 
ensure that the global financial system is better able to 
withstand shocks than it was in 2007-2008.
The analysis suggests a number of actions that the IMF 
and FSB should take to strengthen their cooperation and 
effectiveness, and highlights some of the problems created 
when no single agency has overall responsibility for the 
regulatory oversight of the international financial system. 
More broadly, it concludes that an appropriate framework 
for the governance of macroeconomic and financial policy 
cooperation in an interconnected world is a bimodal 
structure which includes both a restricted executive 
group of leaders who can implement major changes in the 
strategic policy direction to meet unforeseen developments 
and a universal, treaty-based official international financial 
institution that provides regular, consistent policy advice 
to its members.
A more effective structure of governance over international 
economic policy cooperation would be possible if the 
countries and jurisdictions whose leaders made up the 
restricted executive group were to be selected by a more 
systematic and widely accepted process than at present. 
This raises the question, addressed at the conclusion of 
this paper, of what the appropriate relationship should be 
between the IMF’s key governing body — the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) — and an 
executive group such as the G20.
INTRODUCTION
Over the long term, the development of a sophisticated 
financial system is crucial to ensure that savings are allocated 
efficiently to investments that sustain strong economic 
growth. Historically, however, financial deepening and 
innovation have been marked by devastating crises that 
have inflicted severe economic distress.
The crisis that struck the US and UK financial systems in 
2007 triggered the “Great Recession,” caused a number of 
banks at the core of the global financial system to teeter 
on the brink of collapse in late 2008, and led to the vicious 
circle of sovereign debt problems and bank distress in 
the European Union that broke out in 2010. In contrast to 
most of the financial crises that had struck in the preceding 
several decades, the epicentre of this shock was not the 
developing world, but rather the advanced countries 
that were supposed to have the most sophisticated, best-
regulated and safest financial systems — the United 
States, the United Kingdom and euro-zone countries. In 
the Great Recession that began in late 2007, output and 
employment fell precipitously in many countries and 
investment ground to a halt.1 Had it not been for forceful 
actions taken by the G20 leaders at their summit meetings 
and continued vigorous growth of demand in emerging 
market economies (EMEs), these events could have created 
the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression.
Clearly, a crucial priority for global economic policy makers 
must be to ensure that such a tectonic shock does not strike 
the global economy again. If a financial crisis can lead to a 
Great Recession of this severity, global leaders must find a 
way to limit the risks in the international financial system. 
This requires nothing less than a fundamental reform of 
the global architecture of regulation to ensure that the 
financial system can absorb shocks while continuing to 
allocate savings efficiently, even when economic times are 
stormy. It is a key task confronting the players involved in 
the international coordination of economic and financial 
policies.
The recognition that addressing the fallout from the recent 
financial crisis would require a fundamental reform of 
global financial regulation has led to a major change 
in the arrangements for international cooperation in 
economic policy making. At the centre, the G20 leaders 
summit meetings have replaced the Group of Seven (G7) 
as the pre-eminent group for taking strategic decisions on 
policy coordination during times of crisis, implementing 
comprehensive internationally harmonized reform of 
1  For example, in the United States — the advanced country that has 
arguably made the strongest recovery from the Great Recession — it took 
74 months from the start of the downturn in the fourth quarter of 2007 
for private sector employment to recover to its pre-recession peak. The 
average time period required for employment in the United States to 
recover in previous recessions since 1945 has been 20 months.
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financial regulation and coordinating macroeconomic 
policies among “systemically important” countries. The 
G20’s actions in these areas are supported by the IMF, the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the FSB, along 
with the World Bank and a number of other international 
agencies and financial standard-setting groups.
There is now a complicated governance structure for 
economic and financial policy cooperation that consists of 
a restricted ad hoc, self-selected group, the G20; established 
treaty-based institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank 
and the BIS; and specialized entities such as the FSB. 
How does cooperation take place among these actors to 
implement the fundamental reforms needed to ensure 
that the global financial system becomes more robust to 
withstand shocks than it was in 2007-2008?
To address these questions with an emphasis on financial 
regulatory reform, this paper focuses on the G20 leaders 
summit, the IMF and the FSB. First, the G20 summit 
consists of a restricted group of heads of state and 
government — a self-appointed body that had not met at 
the summit level before the financial crisis “went critical” 
in late 2008. Second is the IMF, with its permanent, treaty-
based system, universal membership (188 countries) and 
mandate to foster international cooperation in economic 
policy making. Third is the FSB — created by the G20 
in 2009 as the successor to the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) — which has the challenging task of coordinating 
implementation of the G20’s ambitious program of global 
financial regulatory reform.
How do these three entities — one ad hoc and self-selected, 
one treaty-based and systemic, and one a creation of the ad 
hoc grouping — work together? Does the combination of a 
self-appointed group of countries like the G20 and a treaty-
based, universal institution such as the IMF constitute 
“good governance” of the global economic and financial 
system? Where exactly does the FSB fit into this governance 
structure — is it a transient institution or a permanent 
feature of the international financial landscape? And how 
is the governance of global economic policy cooperation 
likely to evolve in the future?
This paper addresses these issues. The analysis suggests 
a number of specific actions that the IMF and FSB should 
take to strengthen their cooperation and effectiveness in 
their respective roles. It highlights some of the problems 
created by the fact that no single agency or group has 
overall responsibility for oversight of the international 
financial system. Finally, the analysis in this essay reaches 
the key conclusion that a bimodal structure of governance 
for macroeconomic and financial policy cooperation — 
comprised of both a restricted executive group of leaders 
that can implement major changes in the strategic policy 
direction to meet unforeseen developments and a universal 
treaty-based official international financial institution that 
provides regular and consistent policy advice to all its 
members — is an appropriate framework for managing 
the global financial system in both good times and bad. 
Indeed, it appears that this bimodal structure is particularly 
effective in times of crisis, when a new policy direction 
must be implemented.
This conclusion, however, does not mean that the 
restricted executive decision-making body should be self-
selected, which has been the case for over three decades 
with the Group of Five (G5), the G7 and the G20. A more 
effective structure of governance over international 
policy cooperation would be possible if the countries 
and jurisdictions whose leaders made up the restricted 
executive group were to be selected by a more systematic 
and widely accepted process. This conclusion inevitably 
raises the question — addressed at the end of this paper 
— of what the appropriate relationship should be between 
the IMF’s key governing body — the IMFC — and groups 
such as the G5, G7 and G20.
POST-CRISIS POLICY 
COOPERATION
When the G20 leaders held their first summit meeting in 
Washington, DC, in the depths of the financial crisis in 
November 2008, they abruptly set aside the G7 as the pre-
eminent, self-appointed group to manage the economic 
and financial policy response to the crisis. The sweeping 
nature of this decision is reflected in their later assertion — 
in the Pittsburgh summit Leaders’ Statement of September 
2009 — that “we designated the G20 to be the premier 
forum for our international economic cooperation” (G20 
2009b, paragraph 19). Is this rhetoric consistent with 
good governance of international policy coordination? Of 
course, since the G20 includes “systemic” EMEs as well as 
advanced countries, it is more representative of members’ 
relative global economic weights than the G7. But does 
it hijack the prerogative for economic cooperation from 
established, rules-based institutions such as the IMF? 
Or does it provide the essential initiative and direction 
for building a more effective structure of economic and 
financial policy cooperation in the world as a whole?
In the aftermath of the crisis, the IMF has implemented an 
ambitious agenda to support the G20’s new cooperative 
approach by strengthening its surveillance over the 
macroeconomic and financial policies of its member 
countries, increasing its lending capacity and deepening 
its analytical work in identifying low-probability but 
severe downside risks. It has also sought to strengthen its 
governance by raising the “voice” and voting power of 
emerging market and developing countries in its decisions.
The other important innovation in this structure of 
cooperation is the G20’s 2009 decision to transform the FSF 
into the new FSB with an expanded membership, which 
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includes all of the G20 countries.2 The G20 has charged the 
FSB with the task of coordinating the implementation of its 
initiative to build an internationally harmonized financial 
regulatory regime.
What is the relationship among the G20, the IMF and the 
FSB, and how will this new structure of cooperation in 
macroeconomic and financial regulatory policies evolve 
over time? What role does ad hoc cooperation by a self-
selected country grouping such as the G20 play relative 
to more systematic and permanent modes of cooperation 
through the IMF, and official financial institutions 
such as the BIS, the World Bank and other treaty-based 
organizations that have broad country involvement?
THE “GREAT MODERATION” — 
1985–2007
To address these questions, a retrospective look at 
international economic policy cooperation in the two 
decades preceding the outbreak of the global financial crisis 
in August 2007 is useful. During this period, international 
trade in goods and services became not just freer for most 
countries, but so tightly integrated that a global “just-in-
time” supply chain was established. International capital 
movements, which had been tightly restricted by many 
countries throughout the entire period from the outbreak 
of World War I in 1914 to the 1980s, were gradually 
liberalized. As capital began to flow more freely among 
countries, the globalization and deregulation of financial 
institutions and markets closely followed.
During this period, the IMF generally adhered to the view 
of authorities in the advanced countries that international 
financial integration was a benign development that 
contributed to more efficient international risk sharing 
and, thus, was good for financial stability.3 Accordingly, 
the Fund generally saw capital account liberalization as 
a “one-way street” that would culminate in unfettered 
international financial transactions for all countries. 
However, many developing and emerging market 
countries, and some advanced countries, had growing 
concerns about international capital account surges and 
“sudden stops,” especially because they saw monetary 
policy in key reserve-currency countries as being directed 
at their own domestic objectives and generally too 
expansionary. A number of these countries therefore saw 
policies that specifically targeted international financial 
transactions as a needed element of their macro-prudential 
regulation. This difference in perspective came back to 
haunt global financial regulation and governance after the 
international crisis struck in 2007-2008.
2  See G20 (2009a).
3  For a discussion of this issue, see Knight and Ortiz (2014).
Also central to developments during this period was 
that previously closed economies with a huge combined 
population — China, India, Brazil the countries of the 
former Soviet Union and many others — entered the 
international marketplace for the first time. This vastly 
increased the effective global supply of labour, expanded 
international trade and financial transactions and — given 
these countries’ relatively low labour costs — created an 
intensely competitive global marketplace for goods and 
services that held down wage growth worldwide.
This period was not, of course, immune from domestic 
and regional financial system disturbances and external 
debt problems — for example, Mexico’s sovereign debt 
crisis in 1994-1995, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 
and the sovereign debt crises in Russia, Turkey, Argentina 
and Brazil. Nor were advanced economies immune from 
problems, such as the US savings and loan crisis, the 
banking system crises in the Nordic countries in the early 
1990s, and isolated bank failures in Europe.
Overall, however, this was a period of sustained strong 
growth with low inflation in advanced countries and major 
reductions in inflation rates in a broad range of emerging 
market and developing countries, with improved growth 
performance in many. As a result, this period came to be 
referred to as the “Great Moderation” — the two decades 
from the mid-1980s to 2007 during which strong and 
stable global growth was associated with surprisingly 
low inflation and massive increases in living standards 
in a number of previously impoverished countries — 
the emerging market powerhouses that were, somewhat 
inaccurately, nicknamed “the BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa). With these remarkable 
developments, the structure of the global economy 
changed in major ways.
But underneath these apparently benign trends, the 
Great Moderation was associated with rising economic 
imbalances and financial risks. Strong growth in consumer 
spending in a number of mature economies caused a 
decline in household saving relative to disposable income. 
In the latter years of the Great Moderation, after a number 
of emerging markets recovered from periods of financial 
instability, strong export growth in these countries 
and rapidly rising consumer spending in a number of 
developed economies led to the accumulation of global 
imbalances that heightened financial systemic risks. In the 
United States, the consumption surge was often based on 
withdrawals of home equity through second mortgages, 
which weakened household finances. Meanwhile, high 
saving rates persisted in many EMEs, particularly from 
the late 1990s onward in East Asian economies that sought 
to self-insure against financial stresses in response to the 
painful memories of the financial crisis they had suffered in 
1997–1999. Countries with balance-of-payments surpluses 
made large official purchases of dollar-denominated 
fixed income assets into their foreign exchange reserves, 
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which both held down their exchange rates against the 
dollar and contributed to unusually low yields on dollar-
denominated assets. In response, investors in low-interest-
rate environments took on greater credit and market risks, 
creating heightened demand for complex structured credit 
products backed by US residential mortgages. This fuelled 
a feedback loop of rising house prices and accelerating 
credit growth.
Low inflation and solid global growth performance during 
the Great Moderation were seen as a triumph of inflation-
targeting monetary policy. Policy makers, economists 
and pundits overlooked the impact of the dramatic 
increase in the global labour supply and the persistence 
of international payment imbalances that combined 
excessive current account deficits in some countries 
with excessive surpluses in others. These features of the 
Great Moderation were key “risk drivers” that led to the 
international financial crisis of 2007.
The most important risk drivers — the trigger mechanisms 
for the crisis — were the hidden vulnerabilities building 
up in the financial systems of a number of countries. In 
particular, in the United States and several other advanced 
countries the period was marked by very large increases 
in the proprietary trading and securitization activities 
of large internationally active banks, high recourse to 
unstable wholesale funding by investment banks, a sharp 
rise in banks’ use of leveraged off-balance sheet vehicles 
that were largely invisible to regulators,4 a huge rise in US 
residential mortgage debt that was securitized and spread 
around the world, a “reach for yield” by investors and 
massive growth in lightly regulated “shadow banking” 
activities.
By the early 2000s some observers recognized that these 
developments were, at the very least, a stable global 
“disequilibrium.”5 However, there was insufficient 
economic policy coordination to resolve this disequilibrium. 
These macroeconomic and financial imbalances were the 
underlying causes of the international financial crisis of 
2007–2009.
4  While some regulators were aware that banks were increasingly 
making use of off-balance sheet vehicles in the run-up to the crisis, the 
then prevailing accounting rules prevented them from appreciating how 
large these vehicles were becoming in aggregate, relative to bank balance 
sheets. Furthermore, regulators were generally not aware of the extent of 
the implicit and explicit guarantees that financial institutions had made 
to support these vehicles.
5  See Borio and White (2003) and Knight (2005).
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
POLICY COOPERATION IN THE 
GREAT MODERATION
During the Great Moderation, international economic 
and financial cooperation developed a characteristic 
set of structures and dominant country groupings. As 
early as 1961, the central bank governors of a handful 
of industrial countries who met regularly at the BIS in 
Basel, Switzerland, had established the Group of Ten 
(G10) to formalize their commitment to work together 
on central banking issues. The first self-selected club of 
“key country” macroeconomic policy makers, the G5, 
was established as a meeting of high-level policy makers 
from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
the United States in 1973 to address the spike in oil prices 
associated with the Middle East oil embargo (Boughton 
2014). In November 1975, France — as the host country of 
the Rambouillet Economic Summit — invited the prime 
minister of Italy to join the group. To counterbalance this 
increase in the weight of European countries, the next year, 
the United States — as host of the Puerto Rico Summit — 
brought Canada into the group to form the G7.
For the next three decades, the G7 leaders were the highest-
level, self-selected group that managed international 
cooperation in macroeconomic policies.6 They were 
assisted at the technical level by the projections of the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) exercises and other 
policy documents.7 However, the G7 leaders did not (as 
far as can be determined) devote significant time to issues 
of financial regulation. This was almost certainly because 
— despite facts to the contrary — G7 leaders generally 
regarded their own countries as immune to financial 
system-wide crises, which they viewed as endemic to 
developing economies.
Thus, the main impetus to strengthening financial 
regulation and banking soundness continued to come 
from the central bank governors who gathered regularly 
at the BIS. Among their important regulatory innovations 
was the 1988 “Basel Accord,” which achieved a significant 
strengthening of the capital adequacy of internationally 
active banks in the early 1990s. Furthermore, in the mid-
1990s, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors created 
the “Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision,” 
6  In 1998, the G7 began to invite Russia to attend parts of its meetings 
(the parts that included Russia being referred to as the “G8”). This 
arrangement continued until early 2014, when it was discontinued due 
to differences between Russia and the West concerning Ukraine.
7  Until 1979 the WEO papers were confidential documents prepared 
by the Fund staff for the authorities of IMF member countries. From May 
1980, they were made publicly available after discussion by the Fund’s 
executive board.
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which established international best practice standards for 
banking and its regulation.8
Following the introduction of the Core Principles, and 
partly at the behest of the emerging economies of central 
and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, in the 
mid-1990s the IMF began to undertake assessments of 
the financial systems of a number of — mainly emerging 
market — countries. This activity proved successful and 
was formally endorsed by the G7 in the context of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1999. Accordingly, in the late 1990s, 
it evolved into the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), in which the Fund, in collaboration with the World 
Bank (for emerging market and developing countries) 
regularly assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each 
member country’s financial sector. The G7 countries, 
believing that their financial systems were the most 
sophisticated and best regulated in the world, refused to 
submit to these FSAPs until Canada — which had been 
a major proponent of the FSAP — took the initiative to 
undergo one in 1999.
The impetus to establish the G20 came in the late 1990s, 
with the recognition that the rapidly increasing importance 
of EMEs in the global economy made it essential to 
“bring them inside the tent” of a self-appointed, ad hoc 
group of finance ministers and central bank governors. 
Canada’s finance minister at the time, Paul Martin, saw 
the growing importance of emerging market countries 
and also realized that the G7 was a narrow grouping of the 
largest economies, in which Canada had little more than a 
toehold. Martin became a strong advocate for establishing 
a broader group than the G7 to discuss cooperation in 
macroeconomic policy — a group that included not only 
the large advanced countries, but also the EMEs that were 
transforming international economic relations. The finance 
ministers and central bank governors of the new G20 held 
their first meeting in 1999. But it is important to recall that 
prior to the onset of the recent international financial crisis, 
the G20 meetings were held only at the level of finance 
ministers and central bank governors — the heads of 
state and government of the G20 countries displayed little 
interest in the process prior to their emergency meeting in 
Washington, DC, in November 2008.
Another important development for the analysis of 
financial vulnerabilities was the establishment of the FSF 
in 1999. The G7 set up the FSF as a vehicle for enhancing 
financial system soundness through cooperation among a 
broad group of experts on the regulation and supervision 
of financial institutions, markets and transactions. Initially, 
the FSF membership consisted of the financial authorities 
8  The G7 summit in Halifax in 1995 requested that financial regulators 
continue work on strengthening international financial standards — 
a request that was reiterated at the Lyon summit in 1996. The Basel 
Committee published the Core Principles in September 1997, several 
months after the onset of the Asian financial crisis.
of a dozen countries (the G7 and five others chosen for 
the significance of their financial systems) as well as the 
international financial institutions (the IMF, the BIS, 
the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) and a number of international 
standard-setting bodies.9 Each FSF member country was 
represented in its meetings by up to three senior officials 
— from its finance ministry, its central bank and (if the 
central bank was not the financial regulator) the agency 
responsible for financial regulation.
It was considered essential to include EMEs in the 
membership of the FSF for two reasons. First, the effort 
to strengthen the international financial architecture after 
the 1997–1999 Asian financial crisis sought to improve the 
implementation of financial standards, which required 
“buy-in” from non-G7 countries. As Paul Martin stated in 
1999: “it is not reasonable to expect sovereign governments 
to follow rules and practices that are ‘forced’ on them by 
a process in which they did not participate. Therefore, 
whatever form the renewed global financial architecture 
ultimately takes, all countries must ‘buy into it’ and take 
ownership. Only then will the framework have legitimacy” 
(Martin 1999).10 Second, a number of advanced countries 
were concerned that lightly regulated offshore financial 
centres were flouting prudent regulatory practices and tax 
laws through international financial transactions, thereby 
creating an uneven competitive playing field that would 
disadvantage financial institutions headquartered in 
“better regulated” jurisdictions. Thus, the membership of 
the FSF more closely resembled that of the G20 than the 
G7. The hope was to get buy-in from both advanced and 
emerging market countries that offshore centres should 
be constrained from international regulatory arbitrage 
activities, which could cause a buildup of unseen financial 
risks. In its first years, therefore, the FSF focused on 
“naming and shaming” offshore financial centres that did 
not conform to global best practices. Little was it realized 
that these risks would instead arise in the regulatory 
regimes of advanced economies, thereby raising the 
question of what the term “advanced economies” really 
means.
9  In addition to the national financial authorities of the G7, the five 
other FSF member countries were Austria, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Switzerland. The international standard-setting bodies 
that were members of the FSF were: the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 
the Committee on the Global Financial System, and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (all hosted by the BIS in Basel); the 
International Accounting Standards Board; and the European Central 
Bank.
10  See Helleiner (2014).
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LIMITS ON THE IMF’S AUTHORITY 
OVER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM
What actions did the IMF take in the run-up to the outbreak 
of the international financial crisis in the summer of 2007? 
The Fund has been criticized for not alerting its members 
to the buildup of vulnerabilities that led to a near-collapse 
of the financial system in late 2008 and triggered the Great 
Recession. As noted by Knight and Ortiz (2014): “the 
crisis was a massive institutional failure on the part of 
both private and public entities… It served to reveal deep 
flaws in the Fund’s ability to fulfill its surveillance task — 
that is, the monitoring of individual member countries’ 
economic fundamentals and policies (i.e., bilateral 
surveillance) and of their interactions with each other 
(i.e., multilateral surveillance) to identify potential risks 
to the system’s stability and take measures to mitigate 
them.” Nevertheless, in assessing the Fund’s performance 
it is important to understand the constraints under which 
it operates in analyzing financial developments in its 
member countries, and in giving advice on financial 
regulatory policies. This is crucial when considering how 
the management of the global financial system should 
evolve in the future in order to mitigate the possibility of 
another severe global crisis triggering a global recession.
When the IMF was founded towards the end of World War 
II, the vast international financial system that we know 
today was non-existent. For years after the end of the war, 
the international goods and services trade of most countries 
— US-Canada trade was an exception — took place 
under rigid bilateral agreements. International financial 
transactions were tightly restricted by capital controls to 
ensure they were consistent with approved bilateral trade 
arrangements. There was no free convertibility for most 
currencies, even for current transactions, and therefore 
there was no “international financial system” as such. 
Indeed, a fundamental goal in establishing the IMF and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(the World Bank) was to gradually build up an integrated 
multilateral system of trade and payments.
In line with the realities of the time, the framers of the 
Fund’s Articles of Agreement defined the “international 
monetary system” narrowly as: the monetary and 
exchange rate regimes of each currency zone; the stock 
of international liquidity and the arrangements for its 
management; and the economic policies of Fund member 
countries. The Articles gave the IMF a clear mandate to 
oversee the international monetary system in this narrow 
sense, as well as over the economic policies needed to 
achieve a stable system of exchange rates and international 
liquidity. Consistent with this narrow view, the Fund was 
also given oversight of exchange arrangements and of 
payments for current trade transactions. However, because 
international capital transactions were so tightly restricted 
at the time that the IMF was founded — and for several 
decades thereafter — its Articles did not grant the Fund 
analogous authority to oversee international capital flows 
or the international financial system.
Crucially, this meant that in the area of financial system 
development and regulation in its member countries, 
the Fund was not in a position to obtain detailed data or 
authoritative information on a par with what its member 
countries must provide in order for the Fund to fulfill its 
mandate to make its assessments of each member country’s 
macroeconomic policies and current account transactions 
in the context of its bilateral surveillance. As a result, it 
was — and indeed still is — not possible for the Fund to 
assess financial system developments with the same depth 
as it does for macroeconomic developments. This lack of 
needed inputs for an in-depth financial system analysis, 
which would have been greatly alleviated if the Fund had 
been granted authority for the oversight of capital account 
transactions, resulted in an unavoidable “blind spot” in 
its analytical and surveillance work in the financial area, 
which proved to be very important not only to the onset 
of the financial crisis itself, but also to the severity of the 
subsequent international recession.
Despite this obvious lacuna, member countries frequently 
called for deeper Fund analysis of the financial system. 
This created a dilemma: since the Fund did not have access 
to the detailed information required for financial system 
analysis (except in the case of negotiations for stabilization 
programs that involved financial system restructurings, 
such as in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in the late 1990s) 
the Fund experienced considerable difficulty in attracting 
staff with the financial expertise needed to work in this 
area. This dilemma, combined with the Fund’s enthusiasm 
for “one-way” capital account liberalization, was no doubt 
one cause of the lack of consensus on extending the Fund’s 
surveillance mandate to international financial transactions. 
Thus, while efforts were made over subsequent years to 
eliminate this important asymmetry in the Fund’s mandate 
by extending its oversight authority to international 
capital transactions, there was never enough political 
support among its member countries to do so. Indeed, 
tight restrictions on capital transactions were maintained 
by many countries well into the 1980s. Consequently, the 
Fund has never been granted the authority for oversight 
of the highly complex and interconnected global financial 
system that has developed over the past several decades.
The problem, therefore, is that the “international monetary 
system” as defined in the Fund’s Articles is only part — 
although obviously the central part — of the complex 
and ever-evolving web of markets and institutions that 
make up the global financial system today. Following 
the elimination of exchange controls among the 
industrial countries by the late 1980s and capital account 
liberalizations in many EMEs during the 1990s, these two 
elements of the global financial architecture became more 
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tightly interconnected. As a result, today’s international 
financial system is vast and complex. It is comprised 
not only of central and commercial banks, bank holding 
companies and a bewildering variety of non-bank financial 
institutions, but also a myriad of “non-financial” players 
that are deeply involved in financial activities. It also, 
obviously, encompasses a vast array of financial markets; 
clearing, payment and settlement systems; and the legal, 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks, transaction-
processing infrastructures and accounting systems within 
which markets and financial institutions operate.
Nevertheless, right up to the outbreak of the financial 
crisis in the summer of 2007, regulation in the international 
financial system was highly fragmented across countries. 
Oversight of financial institutions and markets remained 
essentially the preserve of national regulators and 
supervisors, despite the seemingly inexorable globalization 
of financial institutions and markets. It is not surprising 
that this fragmented system of home-country regulators 
and supervisors was associated with gaps and overlaps 
in oversight responsibilities, despite the efforts of the BIS, 
the FSF, the Basel Committee and other financial standard-
setting bodies to establish consistent international 
standards of financial safety and soundness. The inevitable 
results were regulatory arbitrage and shadow banking.
Owing to this “home-regulator” structure, the Fund was 
not furnished with much of the information it needed 
to analyze its member countries’ financial systems. 
This certainly limited its scope for addressing situations 
where a buildup of financial stresses triggered a 
substantial weakening of the macroeconomy. The Fund’s 
responsibilities for surveillance over the economic policies 
of its members were seen as only encompassing monetary, 
fiscal and related macroeconomic actions. National 
financial regulators, particularly in key jurisdictions, often 
took umbrage when the Fund made statements about 
financial risks or weaknesses in their regulatory structures.
In response to this lacuna, as early as 2003, the BIS began 
to give increasingly urgent warnings concerning the rising 
risks from high rates of credit expansion in the United States 
and several other large advanced economies, the rise of 
proprietary trading and securitization activities of the large 
internationally active banks and the problem of opaque 
risks in the financial system. In its annual reports and other 
publications,11 the BIS stressed that these developments 
could eventually lead to crisis. But the warnings of the 
BIS went largely unheeded by national regulators and 
investors, who continued to take on increased credit and 
market risk in the existing low-interest rate environment. 
Meanwhile, lacking responsibility for the oversight of the 
international financial system, the Fund focused on external 
current account imbalances and fiscal policies as the key 
11  See, for example, Borio and White (2003), Knight (2005, 2007) and BIS 
(2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).
risks to economic stability in the global economy. Most 
observers saw financial stability risks as likely to break out 
in the emerging market countries, which had been the case 
in the Latin American and Asian financial crises. But of 
course, the opposite happened — a serious deterioration in 
credit underwriting standards in the United States created 
toxic mortgages, and the securitization of structured credit 
products caused these to be bought into the portfolios of 
investors around the world. Thus, it was weaknesses in 
financial structure and regulation in the United States and 
several other advanced countries that caused the onset of 
the international financial crisis in August 2007. That crisis 
triggered the Great Recession of 2007–2009, and in late 
2008 it came within a hair’s breadth of causing a financial 
system meltdown in the United States and several other 
advanced countries. It is the fact that a financial crisis 
triggered the most severe macroeconomic disaster since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s that makes it so important for 
IMF surveillance of its member countries’ macroeconomic 
performance to focus intensively on the policies needed 
to ensure that their financial systems become much more 
robust and less prone to crisis.
Paradoxically, since it is not possible to predict the timing 
of financial crises with any certainty, the fact that the BIS 
had been warning of the possibility of a major meltdown 
since 2003 made it something of a Cassandra by the time 
the crisis struck in 2007-2008. The Fund needs to take 
this experience into account as well. In particular, in its 
financial surveillance work and economic projections 
the Fund needs to distinguish clearly between, on the 
one hand, modest downside risks that can cause mild 
underperformance relative to its “central scenario” 
macroeconomic projections and, on the other, high-impact 
“catastrophic” risks — such as financial crises — that may 
have a low probability of occurring in the near term, even 
if serious stresses are building, but would have a severe 
macroeconomic impact if they did.
THE CRISIS AND THE FIRST G20 
SUMMIT MEETING
The most intense period of the international financial crisis 
— from August 2007 to November 2008 — had a profound 
impact. It exposed major weaknesses in financial and 
macroeconomic policy coordination, and deep flaws in 
financial risk management and regulation in a number of 
advanced countries. The crisis incited the heads of state 
and government of the G20 countries to meet together 
— for the first time — in a hastily organized emergency 
summit conference to agree on a comprehensive strategy 
to restore trust in the financial system and to try to limit 
the fallout on global output and employment. This was 
the beginning of a new self-appointed group of countries 
at the centre of international economic policy cooperation. 
While the G7 continues its regular meetings, the G20 
summits have become the highest-level executive decision-
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making body that establishes the framework within which 
macroeconomic policy coordination and comprehensive 
reform of the global architecture of financial regulation 
currently take place. What actions has the G20 taken since 
its first meeting in November 2008 and how has it been 
assisted by the IMF and the FSB in achieving its goals?
The first summit meeting of the G20 heads of state 
and government, held on November 14-15, 2008, was 
tremendously important because it gave structure, clarity 
and vigour to the task of establishing and implementing 
a plan to address the crisis comprehensively, in both its 
financial and broader macroeconomic implications. After 
more than a year of drift, finally a key group of world 
leaders was acting boldly to resolve the crisis and draft 
a detailed blueprint for financial regulatory reform and 
macroeconomic stimulus.
The centrepiece of the G20 program is a fundamental 
and internationally harmonized reform of the global 
architecture of financial regulation. To accomplish this, the 
first leaders’ level G20 summit seized upon the blueprint 
for financial regulatory reform that the FSF had presented 
six months earlier in a special report to the G7 finance 
ministers and governors of April 2008. Because the G20 
leaders essentially adopted the recommendations of this 
report wholesale, their Summit Declaration contained an 
astonishingly detailed program in terms of the actions to be 
taken, the bodies that should conduct the actions and the 
ambitious timetable over which it should be implemented.
The G20 action plan endeavours to achieve an 
internationally harmonized financial regulatory regime 
that would greatly strengthen financial institutions, 
markets and infrastructures around the world — a 
highly ambitious but essential goal. It focuses on vastly 
strengthening the capital and liquidity that the banks at 
the core of the international financial system hold against 
their credit, market, liquidity and operational risks. It also 
seeks to strengthen the banks’ risk management practices 
more generally and to increase the transparency of their 
valuations of the financial instruments held on their 
balance sheets. The central elements of the program are:12
• measures to strengthen capital adequacy and liquidity 
requirements, particularly for large internationally 
active banks and other similar institutions;
• establishment of a macroprudential financial 
regulatory agency in each key jurisdiction;
• use of regular stress tests and other rigorous criteria 
to assess solvency, liquidity and other aspects of 
financial institutions’ risk management;
12  See G20 (2008).
• measures to extend the perimeter of regulation to 
non-bank financial firms;
• legal and regulatory reforms to end “too big to 
fail,” including an internationally harmonized 
intervention and resolution regime and “bail-in” of 
private creditors; and
• measures to strengthen the operations and risk 
management of financial markets, clearing 
and payments systems, and related financial 
infrastructures.
The second G20 summit closely followed the first. Held 
in London in April 2009, it focused on the macroeconomic 
policy measures needed to mitigate the adverse global 
output and employment effects of the crisis. The G20 
announced a strategy for an internationally coordinated 
fiscal expansion to be implemented starting immediately. 
The London Summit Declaration of April 3, 2009 observed: 
“We face the greatest challenge to the world economy in 
modern times…a global crisis requires a global solution” 
(G20 2009a, paragraph 2). In combination with the 
monetary stimulus that central banks had been providing 
since August 2007 — and massively since late 2008 — 
this constituted a very large effort to kick-start the global 
economy. The G20 London Summit also transformed the 
FSF into the FSB, with an expanded country membership 
that included all the members of the G20. Thus, the 
London Summit Declaration was not exaggerating when it 
observed that “taken together, these actions will constitute 
the largest fiscal and monetary stimulus and the most 
comprehensive support programme for the financial sector 
in modern times” (ibid.).
Although the G20 countries’ subsequent fiscal policy actions 
did not go as far as this soaring rhetoric promised, these 
commitments still constituted the largest internationally 
coordinated fiscal stimulus ever attempted to ward off the 
adverse effects of a financial crisis on employment and 
output, not only in the advanced countries, but around 
the world. There can be little doubt that these actions 
moderated the effects of the Great Recession. This phase 
of G20 work should be viewed as a considerable success of 
ad hoc cooperation.
The first two G20 summits charged the IMF with 
strengthening its work in bilateral and multilateral 
surveillance, particularly with regard to the financial 
system. It set the FSF/FSB the complex task of organizing 
and prioritizing the work of the disparate financial 
standard-setting bodies that are developing the new 
financial regulatory rules, pressing them to meet their 
timetables, reviewing and coordinating the policy 
proposals contained in the exposure drafts for the new 
regulations, and generally ensuring that the whole 
“creaking” process goes forward in a rational way.
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In summary, the financial crisis and the Great Recession 
fundamentally transformed the structure of international 
economic and financial cooperation. The G20, the IMF and 
the FSB — along with other institutions such the central 
bankers’ meetings at the BIS, the European Commission, 
national policy makers and the expert groups of standard 
setters — have been steering the comprehensive financial 
reform program.
The present structure of cooperation to strengthen the 
international financial system has a reasonably solid logic. 
The G20 includes most of the jurisdictions that constitute 
the core of the global financial system. It is natural that 
these fundamental reforms should be taking place in 
both advanced countries and EMEs. Financial regulatory 
reform is needed in the United States — whose severe 
and unexpected financial frailties made it the epicentre 
of the alarming initial phases of crisis — and in the 
United Kingdom, where regulators were complacent 
about liquidity risks in major lenders. It is needed in the 
euro zone, where previously unseen gaps in national 
financial regulation allowed weaknesses to develop in 
the risk management practices of private sector financial 
institutions, and permitted a massive buildup of euro-zone 
bank holdings of “peripheral country” sovereign debt, 
which created a vicious circle of deteriorating solvency 
for both sovereign borrowers and banks. And financial 
regulatory reform is also needed in the EMEs, many of 
which have suffered severe financial crises in the past, as 
well as having experienced strong adverse spillovers from 
the crisis in the form of massive capital surges and sudden 
stops. However, it is important to note that these needs 
also stem from the fact that in the current structure of 
cooperation, no single body has a clear mandate to oversee 
the international financial system as a whole.
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE IMF 
AND THE FSB
The G20’s assignment of new functions to the FSB meant that 
there must be a clear division of responsibilities between 
the FSB and the IMF. The arrangements were set out in 
a letter dated November 13, 2008, signed by Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, then managing director of the IMF, and 
Mario Draghi, then governor of the Banca d’Italia and 
chairman of the FSF. The letter specifies that the principal 
task of the FSF/FSB is “the elaboration of international 
financial sector supervisory and regulatory policies and 
standards, and coordination across various standard-
setting bodies” (IMF and FSF 2008). The Fund’s main 
responsibility is to assess the “authorities’ implementation 
of policies through FSAPs, ROSCs [Reviews of Standards 
and Codes] and Article IVs.” It also states that the IMF 
“participates in this work and provides relevant inputs as 
a member of the FSB” (ibid., emphasis added) — wording 
that appears to imply that the Fund has no more authority 
in the financial regulatory sphere than any other member 
of the FSB.
Unfortunately, this letter also contains the assertion 
that “surveillance of the global financial system is the 
responsibility of the IMF” (ibid.). Including this statement 
was a serious error on the part of the IMF managing 
director because it involves significant bureaucratic 
overreach: nowhere in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement is it 
stated that the IMF has any responsibility for surveillance 
over the global financial system. Thus, the Fund does 
not have a formal mandate to oversee the international 
financial system or to require its members to conform to 
any set of financial regulatory standards or obligations. 
And correspondingly, as we have seen, the Fund does not 
have the authority to obtain the information it would need 
to do so effectively. Indeed, the fact that the international 
community has not granted any institution or body the 
mandate to oversee the international financial system 
is a major governance issue in international financial 
regulatory cooperation which needs to be resolved if crises 
like that of 2007-2008 are to be avoided or mitigated in the 
future.
Since the crisis, Fund management has sought, particularly 
through the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision, to 
make clear to the membership the crucial linkage that 
exists between global financial stability and the stability of 
the international monetary system.13 While most observers 
would now acknowledge that global financial stability 
must be a focus of the Fund’s multilateral surveillance, 
the Fund’s efforts in this area are still impeded by limits to 
the data and information it can obtain to analyze financial 
system developments and potential risks. Nevertheless, 
even lacking these formal oversight prerogatives, the Fund 
can provide very useful input for judging whether its 188 
member countries live up to their general obligation to 
achieve best practice in financial regulation.
The joint IMF and FSB letter has inadvertently shone a light 
on a governance weakness in the international financial 
system: no institution, including the IMF, has a specific 
mandate to oversee the international financial system as a 
whole. The fact that the Fund lacks this mandate has created 
uncertainty about its role in its member countries’ financial 
systems and their regulation. Obviously, if financial 
system crises have a high probability of causing severe 
recessions, the Fund must be able to study its members’ 
financial systems in order to carry out its macroeconomic 
surveillance responsibilities. And just as clearly, national 
and international regulatory bodies are currently not about 
to cede their authority to the Fund. This important issue is 
discussed further below.
13  Even before the advent of the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD), 
the Fund had established flagship products, such as the Global Financial 
Stability Report (GFSR), that focus on the surveillance of the global 
financial system.
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These considerations also bring to light long-standing 
weaknesses in the governance and organization of 
financial regulation within the European Union and 
the euro zone, which are only gradually being resolved. 
Despite the strong political commitment to build a single 
marketplace for financial services in Europe, throughout 
the period up to late 2008 the financial scene was still 
dominated by national financial supervisors rather than 
pan-EU regulatory authorities. Although there were EU-
wide advisory bodies for financial regulation prior to 
the onset of the crisis, they had no authority to review 
or override the decisions of national financial regulators 
within the European Union. The Report of the “High-
level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU” (the de 
Larosière Group), submitted to the European Commission 
in early 2009, was the first to recommend the bold step 
of establishing EU-wide regulatory agencies that would 
have the power to draft uniform EU financial regulatory 
standards and override the powers of national regulators 
and supervisors in cases of conflict with the EU standards. 
The crisis provided a strong motivation for adopting these 
recommendations, and the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) were duly established. 
Nevertheless, owing to the nexus of instability created by 
European bank lending to peripheral euro-zone sovereigns, 
the European Union has been slow to transfer authority 
for financial regulation and supervision of the largest 
banks to the European Central Bank in the context of the 
single supervisory mechanism. It has been even slower to 
put in place the mechanisms for support of weak financial 
institutions, owing to disagreements over funding sources 
for such mechanisms.
THE G20 AND THE GOVERNANCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
IN MACROECONOMIC AND 
FINANCIAL POLICIES
In the new structure, the G20 leaders summit is the 
overarching self-selected group that charts the course 
of international cooperation in economic and financial 
policy making. The Fund is the permanent rules-based 
body tasked with implementing surveillance over its 
members’ policies, maintaining internationally consistent 
economic data, analyzing those data to formulate its 
policy advice and ensuring, through its semi-annual WEO 
and GFSR, that its recommendations for policy actions are 
both consistent and actionable at the global level. These 
features of the IMF make it the obvious body for providing 
the hard information and policy recommendations 
that are presented to G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors as inputs into their semi-annual policy 
discussions, and then to the G20 leaders at their summit 
meetings. Finally, the FSB is the body charged with 
overseeing the implementation — for the first time — of an 
internationally harmonized financial regulatory reform. How 
well are these three players interacting on the international 
stage? How are the relations among them likely to change 
in the future? These questions are considered below.
The G20 currently “rules the roost” in directing the 
course of international economic and financial policy 
cooperation. What are its strengths and weaknesses from 
a governance perspective? The G20 is more representative 
than previous “Gs,” in that it has a broader country 
representation. Unlike the G5, G7 or G10, the G20 reflects 
an explicit acknowledgement by the advanced countries 
that at least the “systemic” EMEs should have a voice 
in the deliberations of the body that charts the course of 
cooperation. Nevertheless, it remains a restricted, self-
selected group of national leaders and it shares with the 
older, self-appointed groups of countries some obvious 
governance weaknesses. Unlike the members of the 
Fund’s IMFC, participants in the G20 leaders summits and 
ministerial meetings are not obliged to represent anything 
other than their own national interests. While there was 
effective cooperation in the recent period of severe stress, 
there is no commitment to take into account the concerns 
of countries outside the G20, or to guarantee that G20 
decisions will reflect what is best for the global economy. 
Furthermore, there is no established process by which 
countries in the G20 are chosen to enter or leave the group 
as the economic weights of different countries evolve. It 
is, therefore, quite likely that the membership of what is 
now the G20 could change in unpredictable ways over the 
course of time. Interestingly, the G20 has not established 
a permanent secretariat and instead relies on a rotation of 
country chairs to prepare its meetings, with input from the 
IMF, FSB and other bodies that provide ongoing support 
to its initiatives.
Nevertheless, at several summit meetings after the two 
initial ones, the G20 leaders continued to give impetus to 
their blueprint for reform of the architecture of financial 
regulation and to fiscal stimulus. As an indication of its 
commitment to macroeconomic policy coordination, the 
G20 established, in 2009, new procedures of “surveillance” 
over its members’ macroeconomic policies to ensure 
they were mutually consistent and would contribute to 
sustainable non-inflationary growth once the immediate 
crisis was resolved.
Called the “Framework for Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth,” this procedure is implemented through 
a Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), which reviews each 
G20 country’s economic objectives and the policies it 
employs to achieve them. The MAP is guided by the G20 
members, which retain “ownership” of the process. It is 
supported by the Fund in a way that makes use of the 
Fund’s technical expertise to review G20 countries’ policies 
within a clear analytical framework, thereby helping to 
promote international consistency in the economic policies 
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of G20 members. Specifically, the Fund’s job is to assess 
whether each member’s policies are consistent with the 
G20’s agreed overall goals, and have a good prospect of 
achieving sustainable and balanced growth for the world 
economy. This means, of course, that the MAP assumes 
that Fund staff will make recommendations for any policy 
adjustments that are needed in order to achieve the stated 
goal. The work on the MAP is an important task for the 
Fund, requiring substantial staff resources, but it is a useful 
role that the IMF should continue.
Despite the G20’s clear focus during the crisis in 2008-2009, 
its subsequent summits have not made much progress 
since then in enhancing economic cooperation. As the 
immediacy of the financial crisis and global recession has 
faded, political leaders — whether prime ministers or 
finance ministers — have been increasingly occupied with 
other issues at home. Inevitably, the spirit of cooperation 
needed to confront the crisis has also waned, leading to a 
certain degree of fragmentation in the regulatory reform 
program, as leaders begin again to look at regulatory 
issues in terms of punishing the past misdeeds of financial 
market players and backing “national champions.”
As a result, in the period since the structure for reforming 
global financial regulation was established and the division 
of responsibilities between the IMF and the FSB mapped 
out, subsequent meetings of G20 leaders have been 
much less focused than the two first summits, although 
they have tried to maintain the schedule of financial 
regulatory reform. Recent summits have also succumbed 
to “mandate creep.” When no crises are on the horizon, 
leaders find other worthy topics to discuss — tax evasion, 
climate change, corruption and energy, among others 
— which, whatever their intrinsic interest, largely fall 
outside the scope of macroeconomic policy cooperation. 
The recent Australian presidency of the G20 endeavoured 
to focus on certain major issues, but it is likely that, over 
time, the ability of the G20 to ensure cooperation in the 
implementation of financial and macroeconomic policies 
by its member countries will decline — at least until the 
next crisis strikes.14
Tensions among advanced countries, EMEs and developing 
economies are likely, in this context, to come to the fore 
when new stresses arise. It remains to be seen how long 
the G20 in its present form will remain at the political apex 
of economic policy coordination. The main conclusion is 
that for the immediate future, the G20 will likely continue 
to be the self-appointed political leader “calling the shots” 
in international policy cooperation.
14  It is worth noting that the shifting priorities from one summit 
meeting to the next are largely the result of the host country presidency 
being granted the authority to determine the summit agenda.
STRENGTHENING THE FUND’S 
SURVEILLANCE OF MEMBER 
COUNTRIES’ POLICIES
IMF management and staff have responded proactively 
to criticism that the Fund’s extensive work in bilateral 
and multilateral surveillance over member countries did 
not foresee the growing risks to the world economy that 
caused the international financial crisis and triggered the 
severe and prolonged global Great Recession.
In 2012, the Fund’s executive board took an important 
step by approving the Integrated Surveillance Decision, 
which increases the consistency between bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance and makes it both more forward-
looking and more focused on identifying the key risks to 
the global economy, the likelihood they may occur and 
the policy actions needed to mitigate them. To do this, the 
Fund has expanded the tools it uses to analyze economic 
and financial developments, as well as the number of 
surveillance “products” it distributes to support its policy 
recommendations.
In addition to the Fund’s “flagship” offerings — the WEO, 
the GFSR and the Fiscal Monitor — this work now includes:
• The Early Warning Exercise — a confidential 
presentation made exclusively to meetings of the G20 
and the IMFC;
• Spillover reports — analyses of the economic and/
or financial developments that are being transmitted 
from one economy to another (including “outward 
spillovers” from developments in systemic countries 
to other countries, “inward spillovers” onto a country, 
caused by external developments and “spillbacks”);
• Vulnerability exercises — confidential internal staff 
reports that identify countries that are most likely to 
experience adverse developments in the near term; 
and
• The Global Risk Assessment Matrix — an internal 
staff assessment of potential global and regional risks, 
and the likelihood of their occurrence that is updated 
at least quarterly to provide Fund management with 
an up-to-date and consistent appreciation of the key 
risks surrounding the staff’s baseline forecasts.15
15  The Fund also employs a number of structural multi-country models, 
global vector autoregression models and dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models in the preparation of the documents listed here.
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STRENGTHENING THE IMF’S 
ANALYSIS OF HOW THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM TRANSMITS RISKS TO 
THE MACROECONOMY
The IMF has taken on board a key lesson from the financial 
crisis and the Great Recession: namely, that while mild 
recessions may be caused by macroeconomic developments 
or policy shifts that are slow moving and not difficult to 
recognize (for example, the end of an investment boom, a 
weakening of consumer spending, austerity measures to 
correct a fiscal deficit or a central bank’s decision to “take 
the punch bowl away” by tightening monetary policy to 
avoid overheating) financial system crises — in contrast 
— tend to leave severe recessions in their wake. This is 
partly because, for a certain period of time, they make 
economic agents profoundly reluctant to take risks — and 
judicious risk-taking is the essence of a dynamic, growing 
economy.16 It is also because they give rise to “balance 
sheet recessions,” which emerge after the bursting of a 
major asset price bubble (for example, real estate, tech 
stocks) that significantly reduces the net worth of the 
private sector. To repair its balance sheet, the private sector 
starts deleveraging, even at zero interest rates; household 
savings and corporate profits need to be used to repay 
debt, and large concentrated asset sales depress prices. 
These are exactly the sorts of immiserizing events that the 
Fund’s bilateral and multilateral surveillance work should 
be designed to avoid or mitigate.
If financial crises trigger the most severe recessions, the 
Fund must be able to analyze this linkage, even if it has no 
authority under its Articles of Agreement to “oversee” the 
international financial system. The Fund made significant 
enhancements to its approach to financial surveillance 
following the 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review. Thus, 
the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD)17 enjoins 
the Fund to focus much more than it has in the past on 
domestic and international financial developments and 
their impact on the rest of the economy. Accordingly, in 2012 
the Fund launched a new financial surveillance strategy 
that attempts to build sounder analytical foundations to 
strengthen its integrated policy analysis.
16  This observation is consistent with historical experience — not 
only from the recent crisis and Great Recession, but also from the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the Nordic countries’ banking crisis of the 
early 1990s, the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, as well as many 
individual countries’ experiences — namely, that the most severe and 
protracted recessions are those that are triggered by a financial crisis. This 
is broadly the conclusion of Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009) in their classic 
study of financial crises over several centuries.
17  See IMF (2012a; 2012b). Further enhancements are to be expected 
when the Fund’s executive board completes the 2014 Triennial 
Surveillance Review this autumn.
As noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the risks of a 
financial crisis, unlike those of a mild recession, tend to 
have a low probability of occurring over any given short 
period, but a high impact if — or when — they strike. 
The Fund therefore must employ an analysis that links 
developments in the financial system with those in the 
broader economy, recognizes emerging financial system 
vulnerabilities and recommends the policy actions needed 
to avoid or mitigate them. This is difficult as there is not 
much in the way of a well-established theory of how the 
financial and non-financial sectors interact, and because, in 
any case, the structure of the financial system is constantly 
in a state of flux, rendering it an especially unpredictable 
element of the economy.
To judge the risks emanating from the financial system, the 
Fund staff has developed an analytical tool — the balance 
sheet approach — based on a matrix of asset and liability 
positions of the main sectors of each national economy: 
government, the domestic financial and non-financial 
sectors, and the rest of the world. This set of identities is 
then used to analyze how financial shocks are transmitted 
across sectors to assess emerging vulnerabilities, using 
standard indicators such as leverage ratios and maturity 
and currency mismatch measures. The analysis is 
symmetrical in that the leverage cycle is seen as central to 
driving both the risks of an unsustainable credit boom that 
generates asset price bubbles and inflation, and those of a 
financial crisis in which bank deleveraging causes weak 
or negative net flows of credit to the productive sector, 
undermining economic activity.
To cover the international dimensions, the Fund is working 
intensively to analyze how financial developments in 
one country can cause spillovers onto others, either via 
massive capital inflows and outflows, or directly through 
the transmission of shocks to the market prices of assets 
and associated balance sheet effects without inducing any 
balance-of-payments flows.
In all this work, major data weaknesses are a constraint 
on progress, once again illuminating the inconsistency 
between the lack of any mandate for the Fund to oversee 
the global financial system and the pressing need to 
intensify its analysis in this area if it is to be able to prevent 
or mitigate the financial crises that seem to cause the most 
severe macroeconomic events.
CLEAR COMMUNICATION ABOUT 
VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY 
RESPONSES
By enhancing its surveillance work, the Fund’s intention 
is to ensure that risk assessments are more analytically 
based and thorough. In practice, however, its actions to 
achieve a more integrated and risk-focused approach 
are complex and not very user-friendly. In its attempt to 
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“cover all bases” in its new vision of risk-based integrated 
surveillance, the Fund has spawned a bewildering array 
of new or extensively refurbished analytical techniques 
and surveillance products whose logical consistency and 
implications are often less than obvious. As a result, it 
has become more difficult for policy makers and market 
participants — not to mention the general public — to 
discern what the Fund’s key policy recommendations are, 
and what messages it is trying to send about risks lurking 
in the background, especially those that might be unlikely 
to occur during the next 12 to 18 months, but would 
seriously disrupt the global economy if they materialized.
As a number of external observers have recognized, the 
Fund therefore needs to publish a regular report that 
synthesizes a consistent overall view of its bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance work. This report should cover 
the likely evolution of the global economy and financial 
system, the downside risks that can be managed by standard 
macroeconomic policy adjustments, the risks that are not 
likely to occur in the 12- to 18-month projection horizon of 
the WEO, but would have very large adverse consequences 
if they materialized, and the policy actions that would be 
needed to avoid or mitigate such devastating risks. This 
should be done in a format that can be readily understood 
by policy makers, market participants and the informed 
public. And this publication must also succeed in making 
the Fund’s policy recommendations clear and actionable. 
Obviously, this will be a tall order, but it is essential if the 
intensive work the Fund is doing to garner the interest and 
traction it deserves from the policy-making community is 
to be fully appreciated.
WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF 
THE FSB?
What does this mean for the future of the FSB? Thus far, the 
FSB has been effective in overseeing the implementation 
of the G20 program to put in place an internationally 
harmonized financial regulatory regime. It has produced 
a number of papers outlining the general principles to 
which various elements of the reform program should 
adhere. Despite its small secretariat, the FSB is efficient 
in ensuring that the work streams of the multiple expert 
bodies of regulators and standard setters involved in the 
reform program remain on track.
The FSB also cooperates closely with the IMF to identify 
macro-financial risks in the Early Warning Exercise, which 
they present jointly to the G20 and IMFC at the semi-
annual meetings of these bodies. The large amount of 
information that the IMF collects on countries’ financial 
systems in its FSAPs and bilateral surveillance work can 
help the FSB judge the extent to which major elements of 
the G20’s regulatory reform program are being adopted 
by national regulators, and the FSB also benefits from the 
Fund’s bottom-up assessments of financial developments 
and emerging risks in its member countries.
Although the membership of the FSB is larger than that 
of the former FSF, it remains small enough and contains 
enough expertise to be an effective venue for standard 
setters to reach agreement on key elements of the 
internationally harmonized regulatory regime. Thus, there 
is a case for the FSB to become a permanent body in which 
new international regulatory initiatives are designed and 
negotiated for implementation by national regulators.
The FSB has been criticized on the grounds that it has 
been unable to ensure effective implementation of 
internationally harmonized financial standards, as some 
countries have created their own divergent regulatory 
frameworks by not fully adopting FSB-endorsed 
standards.18 It has also been seen as less than successful 
thus far in reaching agreements on burden sharing among 
national authorities to achieve agreed procedures for 
resolving distressed financial firms whose activities span 
multiple jurisdictions. Indeed, some commentators have 
remarked that while the international bodies involved in 
financial standard setting, including the FSB, are useful 
in providing an important forum for regulators to discuss 
emerging issues, the capacity of these bodies to highlight 
weaknesses in the regulatory regimes of key jurisdictions, 
identify and focus on emerging risks when they appear, 
and foster regulatory reform, remains quite limited. 
These criticisms reflect the limitations and lack of clarity 
in the mandates of the FSB and the other bodies involved 
in international financial standard setting. Thus, they 
are issues that should be addressed urgently in order to 
reduce the gaps and overlaps that are again appearing in 
the international financial regulatory structure.
It could be argued that once a globally harmonized system 
of financial regulation has been established, the FSB will 
no longer be needed. From a governance perspective, the 
argument might be that the FSB answers to the G20, and 
the G20 is a self-appointed group that came together to 
manage the crisis, but is not a permanent fixture in the 
structure of international policy coordination. However, 
it is relevant to note that the FSB was formed out of an 
established permanent body, the FSF, which had already 
been working intensively on financial regulatory issues for 
some years. Indeed, as noted above, it was an FSF working 
group that produced the April 2008 report that became, 
during the crisis, the blueprint for the G20’s ambitious 
financial regulatory reform program. Furthermore, given 
that the IMF does not have a mandate to oversee the 
international financial system, it would seem that the FSB 
18  The efforts of a number of countries to alter the way Basel III is applied 
in their home jurisdictions, and the continuing problems in implementing 
internationally consistent derivatives market reforms between the United 
States and the European Union, are relevant examples.
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may continue to have an important role to play once the 
new financial regulatory architecture is up and running.
Perhaps the most powerful argument for retaining the FSB, 
with its close connections to global standard setters the 
IMF and the BIS, is that reform of the financial regulatory 
architecture will be a never-ending process. This is because 
financial markets are always innovating — creating new 
financial products, new markets in which to trade them 
and finding new clients to use them. As a result, even 
with the reformed financial regulatory regime there will 
always be new, and not easily recognized, incentives for 
regulatory arbitrage in the search for financial market 
profits. And there will always be “deep shadows” in the 
financial system, where some financial players will operate 
with balance sheets that have little capital to back up their 
risky bets.
The newly created macroprudential regulatory agencies, 
together with central banks and financial supervisors 
in various jurisdictions, will continue to need a body 
such as the FSB to thrash out issues among regulators, 
identify emerging vulnerabilities, revise regulatory rules 
as innovation proceeds apace in banking and finance, and 
restrain any tendency of national regulators to begin to 
cause fragmentation in the global financial system by over-
emphasizing local circumstances. The real issue is not so 
much whether the FSB should continue to exist, but rather 
how its country membership should evolve over the coming 
years. In time, the FSB’s central role in implementing global 
financial regulation will raise issues of governance and the 
“voice” of various countries and financial jurisdictions in 
reaching decisions on the key elements of the evolving 
international regulatory regime. These governance issues 
will need to be effectively addressed in order to ensure 
the FSB’s continued legitimacy as a body implementing 
internationally respected rules of conduct for the global 
financial system.
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE IMF IN 
FINANCIAL STABILITY
If the Fund is to give effective policy advice to help its 
member countries avoid the macroeconomic problems that 
are its main focus, then a key task must be to continuously 
improve the information it obtains on financial and 
economic developments in its members, its understanding 
of international linkages, and the analytical tools it uses 
to develop its policy recommendations. Simultaneously, it 
must continue to enhance the governance procedures that 
strengthen its role as an independent assessor and adviser 
to its members. The Fund is already on this road, but what 
more should it do?
First, it must be able to “hard wire” an intimate 
knowledge of the structure of the global financial system 
and its vulnerabilities into its bilateral and multilateral 
surveillance. Since experience shows that the shocks that 
cause the most severe recessions often originate in the 
financial sector, the Fund must focus on that sector as 
much as on other macroeconomic markets and sectors. As 
discussed, the Fund is working intensively to develop its 
work in this field. The key will be to put this all together in 
a communication strategy that gives a clear “bottom line” 
on what the Fund believes are the critical downside risks, 
and its policy recommendations to address them.
Second, in performing this role, the Fund needs to address 
the fact that its Articles of Agreement do not give it a 
mandate to oversee the global financial system nor, by 
implication, to engage in financial system surveillance 
or to obtain the disaggregated financial information it 
would need to identify the emerging risks in the global 
financial system. The G20, with the cooperation of 
national and international financial regulators, has taken 
on the responsibility of putting in place an internationally 
harmonized financial regulatory reform. It is a sensible 
principle of governance that there is a division of 
responsibilities here: the G20 is shouldering the initiative 
to establish a new global financial regulatory regime. The 
Fund, with its virtually universal membership, would 
seem to be the best independent assessor of the degree to 
which each national jurisdiction conforms to these new 
regulatory standards and financial market best practices. 
As already noted, however, the Fund’s lack of a mandate 
over international capital transactions is a significant 
impediment to its capacity to fulfill this role effectively. 
Accordingly, the IMF management should ensure that 
there is a clear understanding by all the Fund’s member 
countries that it is the appropriate body to make these 
assessments on a globally consistent basis. In order to make 
this work more effective, the Fund also needs to develop a 
closer working relationship with the BIS, which possesses 
deep expertise in this area from its extensive research 
on global financial system issues, its close relations with 
the central banking community and the expert financial 
standard-setting groups it hosts in Basel.
Third, it is clear that the Fund should continue to 
strengthen its bilateral and multilateral surveillance, and 
particularly its financial surveillance, within the confines 
of its mandate. It is evident that it is committed to doing 
so from its intensive analytical work for the 2014 Triennial 
Surveillance Review.
Fourth, as the global economy continues to evolve, the 
international community must ensure that the Fund’s 
governance structure adjusts in a manner consistent with 
the changing relative economic weights of its members. 
In 2010, the Fund proposed increasing the quota shares 
and voting rights of member countries whose economic 
weights had risen in recent years, thereby giving more 
voice to emerging market and developing countries 
relative to advanced countries. Unfortunately, the US 
Congress, which must — because of the large size of the 
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US voting share in the IMF — ratify this crucial high-
profile initiative before it can adopted by the Fund — has, 
thus far, failed to pass it.
Finally, member countries should consider amending 
the Fund’s Articles of Agreement to give it jurisdiction 
over capital account transactions in a way that is broadly 
symmetrical with its responsibility to oversee international 
current account transactions under Articles VIII and XIV. 
The Fund has long recognized the important role played by 
capital flows in cross-country spillovers, and has worked 
intensively to develop its new “Institutional View” on 
how to address issues relating to capital flows and their 
role in transmitting spillover effects among countries. 
This Institutional View — which is more balanced than 
past Fund views on the virtues of full capital account 
liberalization — should be developed further as a basis 
for extending the Fund’s mandate to oversee international 
capital account transactions. Such a mandate would help 
the Fund to obtain the information it needs to engage in 
deeper financial system analysis. And, as the Fund has 
realized, this is crucial to understanding and responding 
to financial stresses that can cause severe adverse 
macroeconomic effects. Strengthening the Fund’s role in 
international financial transactions would also clarify the 
respective roles of the IMF, the FSB and the BIS — allowing 
for greater cooperation among all three organizations. For 
these reasons, the aftermath of the crisis would seem to be 
an appropriate time to amend the Articles of Agreement to 
give the Fund the mandate it needs to add capital flows to 
its oversight responsibilities.
COMPLEXITY AND COOPERATION
Improvements to the work of the IMF and the FSB are 
necessary for strengthening the management of the 
international financial system, but at times when the 
global economy faces a financial crisis that could have 
severe macroeconomic effects, it is almost inevitable that 
a small and cohesive group of global leaders will need to 
take the initiative to implement bold steps to alleviate the 
worst fallout. This is why ad hoc, self-appointed groups, 
such as the G5, the G7 and now the G20 leaders, have been 
the focus of policy initiatives when the global economy 
and financial system have come under severe stress.
However, the historical analysis in this paper suggests 
that the current cooperation arrangements for achieving 
global reform of financial regulation and coordinated 
macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis and the Great 
Recession are excessively ad hoc and complicated. The 
players involved include the leaders and finance ministers 
of the G20, the central bank governors and the heads of 
supervision who meet at the BIS, the IMF, the FSB, the 
European Union,19 the international financial standard-
setting bodies and national financial regulators in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and other financial 
jurisdictions. This governance structure is far from ideal for 
ensuring that global financial regulatory reform operates 
in a way that serves the interests of all participants in the 
global economy, and makes the sort of crisis that occurred 
from 2007 to 2012 less likely to strike in the future.
This raises critical questions regarding the long-term 
governance of international monetary and financial 
relations. The G20 has usefully exercised executive 
authority to motivate action in the global financial system 
and economy. But its disadvantage is that the G20 remains 
an ad hoc, self-selected group whose members have 
no explicit obligation to act in the interests of the global 
community as a whole.
In contrast, the IMF is a permanent, treaty-based 
international institution that can focus on achieving the 
appropriate level of coordination of economic policies 
among its 188 members. Fund member countries have 
obligations as well as rights. All member countries — 
whether large or small, systemically important or not 
— are subject to uniform treatment by the Fund in its 
judgments and recommendations on their policies. All are 
represented on the governing bodies of the IMF and have 
a voice in IMF decisions. The membership of countries in 
the G20 carries none of these obligations, and there are 
no treaty commitments that guarantee good governance 
by this body or rational procedures for adjusting its 
membership as the economic weights of various countries 
and regions evolve.
The key governance issue, therefore, is how should 
relations between the G20, the IMF, the FSB and other 
important international financial institutions, such as the 
BIS, the World Bank and the international standard-setting 
bodies, evolve in the future? What arrangements among 
these bodies would constitute effective global governance 
of the international monetary and financial system?
When considering this question it is important to 
recognize that the global economic and financial system 
is “complex” in the technical sense of the term. It is highly 
non-linear and this aspect of complexity means that even 
small developments can have large and unpredictable 
consequences — a “butterfly effect.” Just as a butterfly 
flapping its wings in Beijing could change the weather in 
New York, so too could developments in 2007-2008, which 
might have been easily contained in other circumstances, 
have triggered the chain reaction that caused a near 
19  The relevant institutions for the European Union, which is a multi-
country financial jurisdiction, are the European Systemic Risk Board, the 
EU-wide regulatory authorities — the EBA, the ESMA and the EIOPA 
— and the European Central Bank, which will oversee the new Single 
Supervisory Mechanism for large banks headquartered in the euro zone.
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meltdown of the global financial system and a severe 
and prolonged international macroeconomic event — the 
Great Recession.
To add to this complexity, the financial system is constantly 
innovating — in finance, the cost of creating a new product 
and introducing it in the marketplace is low. Furthermore, 
incentives for regulatory arbitrage make it attractive for 
the financial services industry to introduce new products 
continuously. In the process, the structure of the financial 
system is altered and new risks arise that are not well 
understood by investors or the financial institutions that 
develop them, with the prospect that severe financial 
stresses may arise and not be managed effectively.
Such challenging complexity makes it essentially 
impossible to predict when a crisis will occur or what form 
it will take. Elements of the financial system that proved 
highly robust in the recent crisis — such as the five large 
banks that operate throughout Canada — might have a 
major vulnerability in the face of a different type of stress.20 
The challenge is to make the financial system much more 
robust in its ability to absorb major unforeseen stresses 
when they occur. That is why the G20 financial regulatory 
reform is being put in place under the watchful eye of the 
FSB, and why the Fund is doing so much to strengthen its 
analysis of the role of the financial system in transmitting 
shocks.
Given the difficulty of predicting financial developments, 
what should policy makers do to mitigate the vulnerabilities 
that can cause a crisis such as that of 1929 or 2007-2008? 
What is the implication for the governance of multi-
country cooperation in economic policy making? What 
does it mean, more specifically, for the relations among the 
G20, the IMF, the FSB and the BIS?
An appreciation of the conditions required for managing 
a system such as this can be drawn from an analogy to the 
theory of how a dynamic system can be controlled. Optimal 
control theory suggests that — at a minimum — two 
separate policy elements are needed to control a dynamic 
system. The first, the systematic control element, adjusts 
the appropriate policy instruments according to how far 
the system currently is from its steady state. The second, 
executive (or strategic) control element, alters the strength 
of that policy response depending on whether the system 
is currently moving towards or away from its steady-state 
path. Thus, using this analogy, optimal control analysis 
helps to understand the governance of international 
economic policy coordination, particularly in seeing why 
both executive control and systematic institutional control 
are needed to manage the international economic and 
financial system effectively. Indeed, the conclusion one 
can draw from the sudden emergence of the G20 leaders 
summits as the executive control element in November 
20  See Knight (2012) for a discussion of this issue.
2008 is that a complex economic and financial system that 
is prone to crises is only likely to be controlled effectively if 
these two policy control elements are properly coordinated.
The systematic control element is the IMF — a permanent 
official financial institution that continuously analyses 
economic developments and gives policy advice. The IMF, 
with its universal country membership, brings to policy 
coordination the continuity and consistency required to 
collect the data needed to analyze economic developments 
across countries and give appropriate policy advice to 
member countries. IMF members, in turn, have a “voice” 
in the governance of the IMF, and an obligation to abide 
by its rules and provide the up-to-date information 
the Fund needs to do its job. This element of systematic 
control through the IMF is most effective during “normal” 
times, when member countries’ economic and financial 
performance can be improved by following sound 
internationally consistent policy advice from a neutral 
assessor.
For the past three decades, the second, executive (or 
strategic) control element over the system, has been 
exercised by an ad hoc, self-appointed group of leaders 
and finance ministers — successively the G5, the G7 and 
the G20 — that can take decisive action in a crisis. Such 
groups need to be the other element that exercises control 
because of the complexity of the global economy and 
financial system, its high sensitivity to “tail risks” that 
can occur with little warning and the fact that a financial 
system meltdown is a politically unacceptable outcome. 
In a global economic crisis there must be a group of 
global leaders who are willing and able to take the tough 
decisions needed to address the problem, and then credibly 
commit the countries or regions they represent to make 
the necessary policy changes. This bimodal structure of 
international economic cooperation roughly corresponds 
to what has actually evolved over the decades since the 
first “G” group was established and began interacting 
with the IMF.
The crucial conditions needed to make this bimodal 
structure of control effective are: that the major executive 
decisions taken by the leaders group must be based on 
the same information set as that which the treaty-based 
systematic-control institution — the IMF — employs 
in formulating its regular policy advice; and that the 
systematic controller agrees that the actions decided 
upon by the executive controller are appropriate to the 
circumstances from a global perspective.
For the present, the strategic control element — the 
executive decision maker — is the G20. Compared with 
the G7, the G20 has the advantage that, through its broader 
country membership, it fosters cooperation among the 
leaders of both systemically important advanced countries 
and emerging market/developing countries. From late 
2008 onward, this broader membership showed its worth 
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in dealing with the fallout from the crisis and keeping 
global growth from collapsing.
 Of course, the self-appointed groups of global leaders that 
can garner at least some measure of tacit support in the 
global community tend to remain by force of inertia, even 
after their motivation to oversee policy coordination has 
begun to weaken. As a coordinating body and strategic 
decision maker, the G20 seems to have been losing 
momentum relative to the key initiatives it set in motion in 
its first meetings. Further, as the memory of the crisis has 
faded, the G20 summit agendas have broadened to include 
issues that are not central to achieving global economic 
policy coordination. James Boughton (2014), among 
others, has speculated that the G20 could be “cast aside by, 
or evolve into, a much different group of country leaders 
— possibly including the leaders from a more restricted 
group of countries but with a heavier representation on the 
systemic emerging market countries than in today’s G20 
— calling the shots.” Nevertheless, if the system evolves 
as it has in the past, the G20 will likely retain its role as 
strategic controller for some time, as long as it is viewed as 
“representative” of the global community.
LEADERSHIP OF THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY — THE FUTURE OF 
THE G20
Of course, this is only one possible future for the G20. 
The ad hoc body that will select itself to be the leader in 
economic cooperation sometime in the coming years is, by 
its nature, unpredictable. The basic argument made here 
is simply that two separate and distinct elements appear 
to be needed to achieve adequate governance of the 
international financial and economic system: a systematic 
treaty-based institution with universal membership, such 
as the IMF, and a narrower “G” of global leaders that can 
reach decisions in times of crisis, taking into account the 
recommendations of the IMF, the BIS, the World Bank and 
relevant international expert and standard-setting groups.
Does the executive control group have to be self-appointed 
and non-representative of the larger global community? 
Could stronger governance be achieved if it had a solid basis 
in international law and practice? From the perspective of 
good governance, one suggestion mooted recently is that 
over the longer term it might be desirable to merge the 
G20 with the Fund’s main governing body, the IMFC. This 
would not involve creating a large and unwieldy body 
because, not surprisingly, the list of G20 member countries 
is almost the same as the member countries of the IMFC. 
The important difference for governance is that in the 
IMFC, each country with a seat at the table is required to 
represent a “constituency” of Fund member countries, so 
all members have a voice, either directly or indirectly in 
the Fund’s governing body.
In a paper commissioned by the IMF for its 2014 Triennial 
Surveillance Review, Knight and Ortiz (2014) argued that 
merging the G20 and the IMFC would create the prospect 
of improving cooperation while at the same time increasing 
the voice of countries to reflect changes in their relative 
economic weights. Importantly, the authors noted that in 
order for this to be good governance, there would need to 
be a clear set of agreed rules for adjusting the membership 
of the IMFC over time, as the relative economic weights 
of countries changed with the evolution of the global 
economic and financial system.
To summarize, since the G20’s country membership is very 
similar to that of the Fund’s governing body, the IMFC, 
these two should be merged so that the IMFC becomes the 
pre-eminent body overseeing the global economy. Given 
that political leaders and finance ministers have a mandate 
to act on behalf of their home jurisdictions, such a new 
governance structure could give the IMFC the authority 
needed to provide strategic direction to international 
cooperation in macroeconomic policy and financial system 
stability.
It is worth reiterating that although the G20 is more 
representative of the global community than the G5 
or G7, it is still an ad hoc, self-selected group. The 
recent financial crisis struck at the heart of advanced 
countries that had previously viewed themselves as 
the best managed and regulated. The emerging market 
and developing economies, which had most frequently 
experienced financial crises in the past, were left to 
address the international fallout, in the form of large and 
destabilizing capital inflows and outflows generated by 
financial instability and the unorthodox monetary policies 
used to address the crisis. The cooperation of the leaders 
of emerging market and developing countries in the G20 
proved helpful in dealing with the adverse effects of the 
crisis and keeping global growth from collapsing. Thus, 
another important take-away from this experience is that 
implementing a new global system of financial regulation 
will need the active involvement of the systemically 
important emerging market countries to succeed. This 
requires that they have an adequate voice in the key policy 
decisions that impact the global economy, believe that the 
new financial regulatory regime meets their needs and see 
a real prospect that it will make the global financial system 
more robust.
Much credit should go to the heads of state and government 
of the G20 that, in the depths of the crisis in November 2008, 
they took the initiative to become the strategic controller of 
the global economic and financial system. They provided 
the needed impetus to implement an ambitious global 
financial regulatory reform program and an internationally 
coordinated macroeconomic stimulus strategy to address 
the near-meltdown of the global financial system and 
the threatened collapse of employment and output. This 
does not mean, however, that the G20 should continue to 
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be the ultimate decision maker in the future. As the crisis 
has faded into the past, the G20 leaders’ summit agendas 
have broadened to include issues that are not central to 
global economic management. It is perhaps not surprising 
that leaders need to have something to talk about when 
things seem to be moving along adequately, but discussing 
broader issues may not be the best way to prepare for the 
next economic crisis.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, it is a critical priority for global economic policy 
makers to ensure that a tectonic financial shock does not 
strike the global economy again. Global leaders must 
find a way to limit the risks in the international financial 
system, which requires a fundamental reform of the global 
architecture of regulation. Currently, there is a complicated 
governance structure for economic and financial policy 
cooperation that consists of three entities — one ad hoc 
and self-selected (G20), one treaty-based and systemic 
(IMF), and one a creation of the ad hoc grouping (FSB). 
This paper has undertaken a historical analysis of how 
cooperation takes place among these actors to implement 
the fundamental reforms needed to ensure that the global 
financial system is able to withstand shocks than it was in 
2007-2008.
The analysis suggests that a bimodal structure of 
governance for macroeconomic and financial policy 
cooperation that includes both a restricted executive group 
of leaders that can implement major changes in the strategic 
policy direction to meet unforeseen developments and 
a universal, treaty-based official international financial 
institution that provides regular, consistent policy advice 
to its members is an appropriate framework for managing 
the global financial system. However, this conclusion does 
not mean that the restricted executive decision-making 
body should be self-selected. A more effective structure of 
governance over international policy cooperation would 
be possible if the countries whose leaders made up the 
restricted executive group were to be selected by a more 
systematic and widely accepted process.
The appropriate relationship between the IMF’s key 
governing body — the IMFC — and groups such as the 
G20 that have been self-appointed is that since the G20’s 
country membership is very similar to that of the IMFC, 
these two bodies should be merged into a new IMFC 
that has a stronger foundation in the principles of good 
governance outlined above. Such a fundamental change 
would require deep reflection in order to gradually build 
broad acceptance for this proposal within the membership 
of the Fund. But it would be worth the effort — and even 
the longest journey begins with the first step.
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